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I . REPLY BRIEF 
The issue presented to the Court on appeal is whether 
Lincoln Land has the legal right to control its own 
property and require those who use Lincoln Land's property 
without owner authorization to disgorge any unjust 
enrichment. The sole issue on appeal turns on whether 
Lincoln Land has satisfied the first element of a prima 
facie cause for unjust enrichment: " ... there was a benefit 
conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff.. .. " Brewer v. 
Washington RSA No. 8 Ltd., 145 Idaho 735, 739, 184 P.3d 860 
(2008). Because of the issues framed by LP Broadband's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, the District Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary 
Judgment only addressed the first element of unjust 
enrichment and specifically avoided making any findings of 
fact or conclusions of law regarding the other two elements 
(appreciation 
circumstances) 
of the 
Accordingly, 
benefit 
the 
and inequitable 
attempts by the LP 
Broadband and General Mills to address inequi tabili ty on 
appeal should be disregarded. The District Court erred when 
it determined " ... that Lincoln Land did not, as a matter of 
law, confer a benefit on LP Broadband .... " See Memorandum 
Decision and Order, p. 10, R. p. 502 (emphasis added). That 
legal finding is the subject of this appeal. 
1 
I.A.R. 35 (b) (4) requires Respondent to identify any 
additional issues on appeal. "In Idaho, a timely notice of 
appeal or cross-appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite to 
challenge a determination made by a lower court. Failure to 
timely file such a notice shall cause automatic dismissal 
of the issue on appeal." Hamilton v. Alpha Servs., LLC, 158 
Idaho 683, 693, 351 P.3d 611 (Idaho 2015); citing Miller v. 
Ed. of Trustees, 132 Idaho 244, 248, 970 P.2d 512, 516 
( 1998) . Inequity and lack of harm are not issues appealed 
by either party and cannot be considered. 
The District Court determined as a matter of fact that 
a "benefit was conferred by General Mills .... " Id. The 
factual determination that some benefit was conferred upon 
LP Broadband was not appealed by Respondents and is 
conclusively established for purposes of this appeal. 
Respondents did not assert any error by the District Court 
regarding the factual finding that a benefit was conferred. 
The sole issue on appeal is who conferred the benefit, as a 
matter of law. 
Lincoln Land is seeking a disgorgement of the unjust 
enrichment LP Broadband obtained by use of Lincoln Land's 
property without owner authorization. LP Broadband reaped a 
windfall by its unauthorized use of Lincoln Land's property 
for LP Broadband' s commercial operation, without paying a 
2 
fair market rent to Lincoln Land. LP Broadband acknowledges 
paying General Mills only $50. 00 per month to use Lincoln 
Land's property. See Affidavit of Adam Gillings, para. 11, 
R. p. 72. By contrast, examination of LP Broadband's 
invoices establishes considerable revenue, in an amount 
which cannot be disclosed in this brief. See Defendant's 
Supplemental Answers to Plaintiff's First Discovery 
Request, Response to Request for Production No. 5, R. 
Affidavit of Paul L. Fuller including Confidential Exhibit 
A (No Record page number is identified) 
As the owner of the property, only Lincoln Land had 
the legal authority to permit occupancy and use of Lincoln 
Land's property. Lincoln Land never delegated any authority 
to General Mills to sublet the property on Lincoln Land's 
behalf. LP Broadband should not be allowed to justify its 
unauthorized use of Lincoln Land's property based upon an 
ultra vi res agreement with General Mills. As owner of the 
property, only Lincoln Land could authorize LP Broadband to 
use Lincoln Land's property and as a matter of law, only 
Lincoln Land could confer the land use benefit received by 
LP Broadband. 
1. CONFERRAL OF THE BENEFIT 
The primary argument raised by LP Broadband and 
General Mills in their briefing, and the basis for the 
3 
District Court's decision, is that the benefit LP Broadband 
received by utilizing Lincoln Land's property was not given 
directly by Lincoln Land. Under the Lease Agreement between 
General Mills and Lincoln Land, General Mills had no 
authority to sublet any portion of the property to LP 
Broadband. See Affidavit of Doyle Beck, Exhibit 'A', para. 
11, R. p. 383. LP Broadband and General Mills ask the Court 
to ignore Idaho Code Section 55-607, which expressly 
prohibits a tenant from transferring an estate in real 
property which exceeds the tenant's capacity to grant. Per 
Idaho Code Section 55-607, any grant by a tenant, which 
purports to transfer a greater estate than the tenant could 
lawfully transfer, passes to the grantee only that which 
the tenant could lawfully transfer. 
Because General Mills could not lawfully transfer any 
estate in Lincoln Land's property to LP Broadband, under 
I. C. 55-607 no estate transferred from General Mills. All 
arguments asserting that LP Broadband received a land use 
benefit from General Mills must be rejected as a matter of 
law. Only Lincoln Land could authorize LP Broadband to use 
Lincoln Land's real property. The District Court erred when 
it determined that General Mills granted an estate which 
Idaho Code Section 55-607 expressly prohibits General Mills 
from granting. Because LP Broadband could receive the 
4 
benefit of using the rooftop space only from Lincoln Land, 
Lincoln Land satisfied its obligations under the first 
element of a prima facia case of unjust enrichment. 
Respondents seek to deflect the issue of the 
illegality of the LP Broadband-General Mills agreement by 
relying upon Brewer v. Washington RSA No. 8 L.P., 145 Idaho 
7 3 5 , 1 8 4 P . 3 d 8 6 0 ( 2 0 0 8 ) . See LP Broadband' s Brief , p . 11. 
Brewer involved competing rights of co-owners, a fact which 
easily distinguishes Brewer from the present case. LP 
Broadband asserts that because "the legality of the 
permission given was not an issue in Brewer the same is 
true for this matter." Id. at p. 11-12. LP Broadband admits 
that "[i]n evaluating the unjust enrichment claim, [the 
Brewer] Court made no references to the legal basis for 
Inland Cellular's occupancy of the property." Id. at p. 12 
(emphasis added). LP Broadband's application of Brewer 
should be rejected. The fact that an issue was not 
addressed in Brewer does not make the issue irrelevant in 
the present case. Ownership of real property, and the 
authority to transfer real property to others, is directly 
relevant to who conferred, or alternatively who 
appropriated, a benefit. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court 
erroneously interpreted Brewer to "indicate that the Idaho 
5 
Supreme Court did not consider Inland Cellular's use of the 
property without the Brewers' authorization to be 
sufficient, by itself, to establish that the Brewers 
conferred a benefit on Inland Cellular." See Memorandum 
Decision and Order, p. 10, R. p. 502. This erroneous 
interpretation is echoed by LP Broadband ( "The reading of 
the decision on Brewer shows that this occupancy of the 
property, by itself, was not sufficient to show a benefit 
conferred by the Plaintiffs." LP Broadband' s Brief, p. 12) 
and General Mills (" [M] ere unauthorized use of land does 
not equate with plaintiff conferring a benefit to a 
defendant." General Mills' Brief, p. 13). 
General Mills even goes so far as to misquote Brewer 
in order to misapply Brewer's actual holding. General Mills 
cites to Brewer quoting that the Brewers "provided no 
evidence that they had conferred a benefit on Inland 
Cellular or that it had received a benefit. Instead, they 
merely asserted that Inland Cellular's use of the land was 
a benefit." See General Mills' Brief, p. 12. However, the 
full quote finishes as follows: "Instead, they merely 
asserted that Inland Cellular's use of the land was a 
benefit and that it was receiving a below market lease." 
145 Idaho at 739. (Emphasis added). This surgically deleted 
language establishes that the Brewer decision considered 
6 
two elements simultaneously in reaching its determination 
regarding unjust enrichment. The three elements of unjust 
enrichment were not addressed separately. Respondents would 
have this Court interpret Brewer to hold that use of 
someone's real property is not a benefit at all. See 
General Mills Brief, p. 13. Such an interpretation defies 
logic. The District Court, LP Broadband and General Mills 
all rely upon this erroneous interpretation and misquoting 
of Brewer, and to the extent that the Brewer decision 
itself is unclear, it is requested that this Court clarify 
its holding. 
Here the District Court erroneously applied the 
standard for establishing the third element of unjust 
enrichment found in Brewer (inequitable retention of 
benefit) to the first element (conferral of benefit). In 
Brewer, the District Court granted summary judgment against 
the Brewers because "there were no facts in the record 
suggesting Inland Cellular had received a below-market 
lease or that it had received a benefit that would be 
inequitable for [ Inland Cellular] to retain." Brewer, 14 5 
Idaho at 739 (emphasis added). Summary judgment was granted 
against the Brewers because they had failed to provide any 
evidence to meet the third element of a prima facie case of 
unjust enrichment. Brewers failed to provide any evidence 
7 
that Inland Cellular had received a benefit which was 
inequitable, such as a below-market lease. Inequi tabili ty 
applies only to the third element of unjust enrichment, not 
the first. 
By contrast, the District Court here correctly held 
that "Lincoln Land has clearly supported its allegation of 
a below-market value lease, sufficient to create a question 
of fact on that issue." Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 
10, R. p. 502. The standard for the third element had been 
met. The District Court held that the value of the lease 
"relates more directly to the third element in a cause of 
action for unjust enrichment." 
correct. 
Id. This analysis was 
The District Court found that a benefit was conferred 
(i.e. occupancy and use of land), but erroneously found 
that "the benefit was conferred by General Mills and not by 
Lincoln Land .... " Id. Neither Brewer, nor the District Court 
held that occupancy of property is insufficient, in itself, 
to satisfy the requirement of the first element of unjust 
enrichment. The District Court's decision was based on who 
the District Court believed conferred the benefit, not 
whether a benefit was conferred. Any assertion by the 
Respondents that Brewer and the District Court's Memorandum 
Decision stands for the proposition that use of land is not 
8 
a 'benefit' for purposes of the first element of unjust 
enrichment is a mischaracterization of both holdings, 
defies common logic and does not conform to the undisputed 
facts in this case. The ability to use real property is the 
primary benefit of ownership. If use of Lincoln Land's 
property is not a benefit, then why was General Mills 
willing to pay Lincoln Land for the use, and why was LP 
Broadband willing to pay General Mills for use of just the 
rooftops? Each of the sticks in the bundle commonly used to 
describe property rights is designed to represent some use 
benefit possessed by the owner of the property. When any 
stick in the bundle is appropriated, unjust enrichment 
requires the appropriator to disgorge any benefit which was 
inequitably obtained. 
2 . PRIOR CASE LAW 
The following are the unjust enrichment cases which 
General Mills and LP Broadband rely upon or attempt to 
distinguish in opposition to Lincoln Land's appeal: 
a. Med. Recovery Servs., LLC v. Bonneville Billing, 
157 Idaho 395, 336 P.3d 802 (2014). 
This case involved a dispute over wage garnishment 
proceeds which were sent by an employer to the wrong 
collection agency. The funds were never owned or possessed 
by MRS and therefore no benefit was conferred by MRS. The 
benefit was provided by the employer/employee and no funds 
9 
were taken from MRS. MRS brought a claim based upon funds 
that it anticipated it would receive, but that claim was 
properly denied. Because MRS never had any rights in the 
money, it could not confer a benefit, as a matter of law. 
The lower court in MRS specifically held that MRS did not 
have an ownership interest in the garnished funds, Id. at 
3 99, a fact which clearly distinguishes MRS from the 
present action. 
b. Beco Constr. Co. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 Idaho 
463, 797 P.2d 863 (1990). 
This case involved two competing contractors bidding 
on a project. When the low bidder was determined to have 
not met the requirements applicable to bidders, the second 
lowest bidder (BECO) sought a claim for unjust enrichment. 
Because BECO never had any rights to the contract, it could 
not confer a benefit, as a matter of law. The Beco Court 
found that Idaho case law on unjust enrichment required a 
"contractual relationship or a claim to real property". Id. 
at 867. In the present action, the subject matter is 
Lincoln Land's claim to use of real property and therefore 
complies with the requirements outlined in Beco to support 
an unjust enrichment claim. 
c. Stevenson v. Windermere Real 
Inc., 152 Idaho 824, 275 P.3d 839 (2012). 
10 
Estate/Capital, 
This case involved a home buyer (Stevenson) placing a 
deposit with the seller's broker (Windermere) , the funds 
were released to the seller pursuant to the Stevenson's 
authorization and then the seller paid Windermere a 
commission pursuant to an agreement between Windermere and 
seller. When the home sales transaction fell apart, 
Stevenson sought a claim for unjust enrichment against 
Windermere for the commission paid by the seller. 
Windermere was not unjustly enriched by Stevenson because 
at time of payment the funds belonged to the seller to do 
with as they wished. Stevenson had no rights in seller's 
funds, as a matter of law, and Stevenson did not confer a 
benefit. 
d. Brewer v. Wash. RSA No. 8 Ltd. P'ship, 145 Idaho 
735, 184 P.3d 860 (2008). 
This case was addressed in prior briefing and above 
herein. Of the case law cited, only Brewer addresses unjust 
enrichment related to the use of real property, and Brewer 
is easily distinguished on the facts. See supra., p. 5-8. 
e. Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 109 Idaho 737, 710 
P.2d 647 (Ct.App. 1985). 
Both LP Broadband and General Mills strain 
unsuccessfully to distinguish Idaho Lumber, Inc. v. Buck, 
109 Idaho 737, 710 P.2d 647 (Ct.App. 1985). LP Broadband 
asserts that unjust enrichment was proper in Idaho Lumber 
11 
because there was a connection between the parties as 
"Idaho Lumber had supplied materials and services to 
improve ... Buck' s property." See LP Broadband' s Brief, p. 15. 
LP Broadband then asserts that there is not a similar link 
between LP Broadband and Lincoln Land, in spite of the fact 
that the exact same real property link is present in this 
action. As discussed in the Beco case, supra., a link 
between parties in unjust enrichment can be based on a 
claim to real property. By using Lincoln Land's property 
without owner permission, LP Broadband created the 
relationship which gives rise to unjust enrichment. Idaho 
Lumber stands for the legal holding that unjust enrichment 
may be had even if there is an intermediary, such as an 
occupying tenant. In Idaho Lumber the value of Buck's 
property was "unquestionably increased" (109 Idaho at 746); 
in the present case it is conclusively established that a 
benefit was conferred on LP Broadband by its use of Lincoln 
Land's property. 
In Idaho Lumber, the district court "held that it 
would be unjust for Buck to retain all of the enrichment 
without making some restitution." Idaho Lumber, 109 Idaho 
at 746. In citing 66 Am.Jur.2d, Restitution and Implied 
Contracts § 3 (1973), the Court of Appeals held that 
parties "should be required to make res ti tut ion of or for 
12 
property or benefits received, retained or appropriated, 
where it is just and equitable that such restitution should 
be made .... " Id. (emphasis added). General Mills would have 
the Court limit the application of this language to the 
third element of a prima facie case for unjust enrichment 
( inequi tabili ty), however the language is clearly intended 
to identify how benefits are conferred and also applies to 
the first element of a claim for unjust enrichment 
(conferral of a benefit) How benefits are conferred (first 
element) and whether it is inequitable to keep the benefit 
(third element) are both addressed in the language quoted 
from Idaho Lumber. Whether a benefit was received, retained 
or appropriated is properly considered under the first 
element, whereas a determination of just and equitable 
retention is properly considered under the third element. 
The fact that the Idaho Lumber Court applied the language 
to the determination of unjust retention does not prevent 
the language from also applying to conferral of the 
benefit. It is unquestioned that LP Broadband appropriated 
Lincoln Land's property without legal authority. 
3. GENERAL MILLS IS NOT A MIDDLEMAN. 
LP Broadband seeks to avoid responsibility for using 
Lincoln Land's property without authorization by 
interposing a middleman, to wit: General Mills. Unlike the 
13 
Stevenson case, General Mills was not a middleman. LP 
Broadband wishes the Court to believe that Lincoln Land had 
a contract with General Mills and General Mills had a 
contract with LP Broadband. (Lincoln Land -> General Mills 
-> LP Broadband) However, because the alleged contract 
between General Mills and LP Broadband was ultra vires 
under Idaho Code Section 55-607, such a contract assertion 
is invalid. In fact, a relationship exists between Lincoln 
Land and General Mills based upon their lease agreement and 
a second relationship (though not a commercial transaction) 
is implied in law between Lincoln Land and LP Broadband by 
virtue of LP Broadband' s appropriation of use of Lincoln 
Land's property. (Lincoln Land -> LP Broadband) . Lincoln 
Land seeks a ruling that a party that uses real property 
without owner authority is accountable to the owner of the 
property, not the tenant, under unjust enrichment. 
LP Broadband cannot interpose General Mills as a 
middleman to prevent a claim for unjust enrichment, because 
General Mills had no legal right to act as a middleman. 
Lincoln Land is not trying to "cut out the middleman" to 
create liability; LP Broadband is seeking to interpose a 
middleman to avoid liability. The result would be the same 
if LP Broadband tried to interpose any other stranger to 
this action. If anything, LP Broadband's arguments are 
14 
weaker, because Lincoln Land had specifically prohibited 
General Mills, by contract, from granting any estate to LP 
Broadband. General Mills is the sole entity contractually 
and statutorily prohibited from conferring a use benefit on 
LP Broadband, as a matter of law. 
II. CROSS RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
The District Court acted properly when it denied LP 
Broadband's requests for attorney fees under Idaho Code 
Section 12-12 0 because there was no commercial transaction 
between Lincoln Land and LP Broadband. 
1. NO ATTORNEY FEES ALLOWED UNDER IDAHO CODE §12-120(3). 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) states as follows: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, 
account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, 
guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or 
sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and 
in any commercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be 
allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by 
the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to 
mean all transactions except transactions for 
personal or household purposes. The term "party" is 
defined to mean any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the 
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
In Bryan Trucking, Inc. v. Gier, Docket No. 43461, 2016 
Opinion No. 72 (Idaho, 2016), the Idaho Supreme Court stated 
that " [ t J here must be a commercial transaction between the 
parties for attorney fees to be awarded." Id. at p. 5 
15 
(emphasis added); citing Great Plains 
Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466, 471, 36 
P. 3d 218, 223 (2001) . The Supreme Court further stated that 
"only the parties to the commercial transaction are entitled 
to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) ." Id. at p. 5 
(emphasis added); citing Printcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside 
Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440, 461, 283 P.3d 757, 778 
(2012). In Printcraft Press, the Idaho Supreme Court stated 
that "[a] n award of attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-
120(3) is proper if a 'commercial transaction is integral to 
the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is 
attempting to recover."' 153 Idaho at 461, 283 P.3d at 778. 
The Printcraft Press Court went on to state as follows: 
This Court has held that only the parties to the 
commercial transaction are entitled to attorney 
fees under I.C. § 12-120(3). E.g. BECO Constr. Co. 
v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc., 145 Idaho 719, 726, 184 P.3d 
844, 851 (2008); Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 
322, 327, 256 P.3d 730, 735 (2011); Harris, Inc. v. 
Foxhollow Constr. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 
778, 264 P.3d 400, 417 (2011). Thus, even though 
fees are available in cases involving a tort claim, 
a commercial transaction between the parties to the 
lawsuit must form the basis of the claim. 
153 Idaho at 461, 283 P.3d at 778 (emphasis in original). 
In Printcraft Press, the Plaintiff was the prevailing 
party and admitted at trial that there were no contracts 
between the Plaintiff and any named Defendant. Id. Plaintiff 
asserted that even though no contract existed between the 
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parties, it was entitled to attorney fees under Section 12-
120(3) either as (1) a beneficiary of a contract between the 
Defendants and a third-party or (2) under a claim of the 
'totality of the parties' dealings'. Id. Both claims were 
rejected by the Supreme Court. Id. The first claim was denied 
because the agreement was between the Defendants and a third 
party. "Thus, although [Plaintiff] was asserting rights 
created under that agreement, there was no commercial 
transaction between the parties that gave rise to this 
litigation." Id. The second claim was similarly denied as 
follows: "Here, even if there are several commercial 
transactions that created the circumstances underlying the 
claims, none of those transactions are between the parties. 
Therefore, we hold that [Plaintiff]' s claims were not based 
upon a commercial transaction between the parties and we 
affirm the trial court's denial of attorney fees under I.C. § 
12-120(3) ." 153 Idaho at 461-62, 283 P.3d at 778-79. 
As in Printcraft Press, LP Broadband sought attorney 
fees under I.C. §12-120(3) claiming that LP is a beneficiary 
of a contract between Lincoln Land and General Mills ( "The 
complaints of the Plaintiff centered around a commercial 
lease with the Third-Party Defendant and alleged violations 
of that lease." See Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 2, R. p. 527), and asserting a 
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'totality of the parties' dealings' argument ( "The gravamen 
of this action involved the use of the rooftop space by the 
Defendant for commercial usages." Id.). These arguments were 
both specifically rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
Printcraft Press, were rejected by the District Court below, 
and should be similarly rejected by the Supreme Court. 
This issue was expressly addressed in Great Plains 
Equip. v. Northwest Pipeline, 136 Idaho 466, 36 P.3d 218 
(2001). As explained by the Court, "In this case, attorney 
fees were requested for the separate claim of unjust 
enrichment pursuant to I.C. §12-120(3), and the gravamen of 
that claim was a commercial transaction." Id. at 472. 
However, attorney fees were denied because there was no 
transaction between the subcontractors (who asserted 
materialman' s liens) and Northwest Pipeline. Further, there 
was no cont~ntion that the plaintiff had alleged in its 
complaint that there was a transaction between it and 
Northwest Pipeline. For a detailed explanation of the Great 
Plains Equip. holding, the Court is directed to Garner v. 
Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 469-70, 259 P.3d 608 (2011). In order 
to recover under Section 12-120 (3), a claimant must plead 
that Section as the law governing the action, must allege 
supporting facts in their pleadings, the commercial 
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transaction must be integral to the claim and it must be the 
basis upon which the claimant seeks to recover. Id. at 470. 
Lincoln Land has never asserted any claim that a 
commercial transaction existed between Lincoln Land and LP 
Broadband, and did not assert a claim for its own attorney 
fees under I.e. §12-120. See Complaint, p. 4-5, R. p. 18-19. 
This action seeks the disgorgements of profits which were 
unjustly retained as a result of LP Broadband' s failure to 
engage in a commercial transaction with Lincoln Land. LP 
Broadband itself denies any contractual relationship with 
Lincoln Land: "There exists no pri vi ty of contract between 
the parties hereto. There is no contractual relationship or 
duty owed by Defendant to Plaintiff." See Amended Answer, 
Affirmative Defenses (a), R. p. 189. LP Broadband has 
repeatedly asserted that there was no direct benefit 
conferred by Lincoln Land, and the District Court adopted 
that position. See Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions 
for Summary Judgment, p. 8-10, R. p. 500-02. 
Having successfully argued in the substantive litigation 
that no commercial transaction existed, LP Broadband cannot 
now characterize the action as one based upon a commercial 
transaction in order to support an award of attorney fees. If 
no benefit was conferred upon LP Broadband by Lincoln Land, 
then there could be no commercial transaction between Lincoln 
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Land and LP Broadband. Alternatively, when Lincoln Land is 
found to have conferred a benefit as a matter of law, Lincoln 
Land will have prevailed on appeal and LP Broadband will 
again have no entitlement to attorney fees. 
Further, LP Broadband should be judicially estopped from 
now claiming that a commercial transaction existed between 
Lincoln Land and LP Broadband. In addressing judicial 
estoppel, the Idaho Supreme Court stated in Mccallister v. 
Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 303 P.3d 578 (2013), as follows: 
Idaho adopted the doctrine of judicial estoppel in 
Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954). 
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from 
advantageously taking one position, then 
subsequently seeking a second position that is 
incompatible with the first. A & J Const. Co. v. 
Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 684, 116 P.3d 12, 14 (2005). 
The policy behind judicial estoppel is to protect 
"the integrity of the judicial system, by 
protecting the orderly administration of justice 
and having regard for the dignity of the judicial 
proceeding." Id. at 685, 116 P. 3d at 15 ( quoting 
Robertson Supply Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, 
101, 952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct.App.1998)). Broadly 
accepted, it is intended to prevent parties from 
playing fast and loose with the legal system. Id.; 
see also 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver § 186 
(2012). Judicial estoppel protects the integrity of 
the judicial system, not the litigants; therefore, 
it is not necessary to demonstrate individual 
prejudice. Wood, 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P.3d at 16 
(citing Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 
F.3d 778 (9th Cir.2001)). 
Mccallister, 154 Idaho 891, 894. In McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 
148, 155, 937 P.2d 1222 (1997), the Idaho Supreme Court 
stated: "Judicial estoppel is meant to prevent taking 
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inconsistent positions, whether legal or factual, at least 
absent newly discovered evidence or fraud." 
Throughout this litigation, LP Broadband has taken the 
consistent position that there was no relationship between LP 
Broadband and Lincoln Land, that LP Broadband only dealt with 
General Mills and it was unaware of Lincoln Land's ownership 
interests in the subject property. On Page 2 of LP 
Broadband's Memorandum for Attorney Fees, the very same page 
on which LP Broadband sought attorney fees under Section 12-
120 (3), LP Broadband stated: "Plaintiff sought an enormous 
recovery from Defendant despite no connection what so ever." 
R. p. 527 (emphasis added). Having succeeded in convincing 
the District Court that there was no connection between 
Lincoln Land and LP Broadband, and continuing to assert that 
claim on appeal, now LP Broadband seeks to play fast and 
loose with the Court by claiming that there is a connection 
sufficient to create a "commercial transaction". 
This Court should not allow LP Broadband to 
advantageously take the position that no commercial 
transaction exists for purposes of the merits of Lincoln 
Land's appeal, and then assert a second incompatible position 
that a commercial transaction did exist for purposes of 
attorney fees. LP Broadband' s attempts at playing fast and 
loose with the legal system must be rejected to protect the 
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integrity of the judicial system. If as LP Broadband now 
claims on appeal a commercial transaction existed between LP 
Broadband and Lincoln Land, then Lincoln Land provided a 
benefit to LP Broadband as a matter of law and the District 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motions for Summary 
Judgment should be reversed and remanded for trial. LP 
Broadband cannot have it both ways. The principles of 
Judicial Estoppel are designed to prevent this exact tactic. 
Idaho Code 12-120(3) only applies to commercial transactions 
and by denying during trial that a commercial transaction 
existed, LP Broadband is precluded from asserting a claim for 
attorney fees under 12-120(3). 
2. NO ATTORNEY FEES ALLOWED UNDER IDAHO CODE § 12-121 and 
I.R.C.P 54(e) (2). 
With regards to attorney fees claimed under Idaho Code 
§12-121 and IRCP 54(e) (2), the Idaho Supreme Court has stated 
that "[a] n award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
Section 12-121 is inappropriate where a party merely cites to 
the code section and fails to provide any argument as to why 
the party is entitled to the award pursuant to the code 
section." Marek v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 50, 57, 278 P.3d 920 
(2012); citing Bagley v. Thomason, 149 Idaho 799, 805, 241 
P.3d 972, 978 (2010). 
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e) (2) specifically 
states that "[a]ttorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121 
may be awarded by the court only when it finds that the case 
was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation, which finding must be in writing and 
include the basis and reasons for the award." The Idaho 
Supreme Court has further stated in Phillips v. Blazier-
Henry, 154 Idaho 724, 302 P.3d 349 (2013) as follows: 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable 
attorney's fees to the prevailing party." I. C. § 
12-121. "An award of attorney fees under [ I. C.] § 
12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing 
party." Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 235, 220 
P.3d 580, 591 (2009). However, this Court "permits 
the award of attorneys fees to the prevailing party 
if the court determines the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or 
without foundation." Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. 
Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 218-
19, 177 P.3d 955, 965-66 (2008). When deciding 
whether attorney fees should be awarded under I.C. 
§ 12-121, the "entire course of the litigation must 
be taken into account and if there is at least one 
legitimate issue presented, attorney fees may not 
be awarded even though the losing party has 
asserted other factual or legal claims that are 
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." 
Michalk, 148 Idaho at 235, 220 P.3d at 591. 
154 Idaho at 731, 302 P.3d at 356. 
In seeking attorney fees under 12-121, LP Broadband 
simply cited the District Court to Idaho Code Section 12-121 
and asserted that as prevailing party it is entitled to 
attorney fees, without providing any argument as to why LP 
Broadband is entitled to such an award, as expressly required 
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in Merek. LP Broadband's entire argument was expressed in the 
following two sentences: "Defendant successfully defended 
against the unfounded claims of Plaintiff. Plaintiff sought 
an enormous recovery from Defendant despite no connection 
what so ever." See Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 2, R. p. 527. LP Broadband 
presented no argument to the District Court or on appeal that 
Lincoln Land's claims were brought frivolously or pursued 
unreasonably. LP Broadband failed to establish that the 
litigation was brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably 
or without foundation. The District Court was correct to find 
that "[a)lthough Lincoln Land was unable to prevail against 
LP Broadband under a claim for unjust enrichment, its claim 
was not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation." See 
Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motion for Attorney Fees 
and Costs, p. 7, R. p. 566. Lincoln Land conferred a benefit 
on LP Broadband as a matter of law when LP Broadband 
appropriated Lincoln Land's property without authorization. 
Lincoln Land's unjust enrichment claim was not frivolous. 
LP Broadband now seeks to impose a new standard under 
I.C. 12-121: "that there must be one legitimate issue." See 
LP Broadband's Brief, p. 18 (underlined emphasis in original; 
italicized emphasis added). LP Broadband asserts that the 
claim for unjust enrichment is itself the only issue 
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presented and that because Lincoln Land was unsuccessful on 
its unjust enrichment claim, that attorney fees are required 
under 12-121. This interpretation of case law is erroneous 
and should not be accepted. McGrew does not state that there 
must be one legitimate issue in order for a party to avoid 
attorney fees under 12-121, but states "if there is a 
legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be 
awarded under I.C. § 12-121 even though the losing party has 
asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation." McGrew v. McGrew, 139 
Idaho 551, 562, 82 P.3d 833, 844 (2003). This does not impose 
a requirement that at least one claim be legitimately 
triable, but states that if one issue is legitimately 
asserted, no attorney fees may be awarded. Even in the 
District Court's decision granting summary judgment in favor 
of LP Broadband the District Court held that Lincoln Land had 
"clearly supported its allegation of a below-market value 
lease, sufficient to create a question of fact on that 
issue." See Memorandum Decision and Order, p. 10, R. p. 502. 
Thus a triable issue of fact was presented to the Court, 
however the unjust enrichment claim was dismissed on other 
grounds. 
Under LP Broadband's interpretation, parties must be 
assessed attorney fees under Section 12-121 anytime their 
25 
claims are dismissed on summary judgment. LP Broadband's 
reading would completely ignore the requirements of 
"frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation" whenever a 
summary judgment is granted. This interpretation also ignores 
the requirement that "the entire course of the litigation 
must be taken into account." McGrew, 139 Idaho at 562. 
In addition to the District Court's consideration of 
legitimate issues of fact, an award of attorney fees under 
Section 12-121 is not appropriate if a party presents a 
legitimate issue of law. Stevenson, 152 Idaho at 380; citing 
Kiebert v. Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 228-29, 159 P.3d 862, 865-66 
(2007). The District Court here ruled that Lincoln Land's 
claims were "based on a violation of Lincoln Land's rights as 
owner of the subject property." See Memorandum Decision and 
Order Re: Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs, p. 7, R. p. 
566. The District Court also found that Lincoln Land's 
arguments "were supported by a good faith argument for an 
extension of existing law." Id. at p. 7-8, R. p. 566-67. 
After holding that Lincoln Land presented a legitimate issue 
of law, the District Court's determination to deny attorney 
fees under Section 12-121 was appropriate. 
The District Court acted properly when it determined 
attorney fees were not justified under Idaho Code 12-120 (3) 
and 12-121. For the same reasons, this Court should also deny 
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LP Broadband's claims for attorney fees on appeal. "We have 
repeatedly held that we will not consider a request for 
attorney fees on appeal that is not supported by legal 
authority or argument." Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 
369, 79 P.3d 723 (2003). LP Broadband has failed to meet its 
burden of proof and provide argument under either statute 
before both the District Court and on appeal. LP Broadband 
can only recover attorneys fees on appeal upon a 
determination that no commercial transaction exists between 
Lincoln Land and LP Broadband. LP Broadband has failed to 
present any argument that Lincoln Land brought, pursued or 
defended this appeal frivolously, unreasonably or without 
foundation, but merely cites to Idaho Code Section 12-121 and 
fails to provide any argument justifying attorney fees. 
Finally, costs under I.A.R. 40 are only addressed after 
a determination on the merits by the filing of a Memorandum 
of Costs under I.A.R. 40 (c) I. A. R 41 does not provide a 
right to attorney fees, but merely provides the process to 
seek attorney fees. See Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 
369, 79 P.3d 723 (2003): "Idaho Appellate Rule 41 is not 
authority for the awarding of attorney fees on appeal." 
CONCLUSION 
"The essence of the quasi-contractual theory of unjust 
enrichment is that the defendant has received a benefit 
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which would be inequitable to retain at least without 
compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is 
unjust." Beco Const. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 118 
Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863 (1990); citing Hertz v. 
Fiscus, 98 Idaho 456, 457, 567 P.2d 1 (1977); Continental 
Forest Products v. Chandler, 95 Idaho 739, 518 P.2d 1201 
(1974); Bair v. Barron, 97 Idaho 26, 539 P.2d 578 (1975); 
Bastian v. Gifford, 98 Idaho 324, 563 P.2d 48 (1977). As a 
summary judgment movant, the burden was on LP Broadband to 
show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and that LP Broadband is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(a). 
The District Court committed reversible error when it 
granted LP Broadband's Motion for Summary Judgment because 
the very essence of this action is that LP Broadband 
received a benefit which would be inequitable to retain. 
Under Idaho Code 55-607 the District Court erred when it 
determined as a matter of law that LP Broadband' s use of 
Lincoln Land's property was conferred by General Mills. 
Idaho Code 55-607 specifically prohibits tenants from 
conferring an estate which they do not have authority to 
confer. Because Idaho Code 55-607 prohibits General Mills 
from conferring a leasehold interest on the rooftop of 
Lincoln Land's property, Court must reverse the District 
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Court's determination and remand these proceedings to the 
District Court for trial. 
The District Court acted properly in denying LP 
Broadband's claim for attorney fees and such decision 
should be affirmed on appeal. LP Broadband has failed to 
present any argument justifying an award of attorney fees 
on appeal and this Court should deny such request. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /~ day of June, 2017. 
Mark R. Fuller 
Fuller & Beck Law Offices, PLLC 
Attorney for Lincoln Land Company, LLC 
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